Behind Europe’s agenda for undersea internet cables

Submarine cables account for the majority of the world’s internet traffic, but as concerns over malicious actors moving to cripple or interfere with internet infrastructure increase, the European Union has a number of its own projects underway, underpinned by hidden political dynamics.

Undersea fibre-optic cables facilitate 99% of global internet traffic, according to telecommunications research company TeleGeography, making them a crucial, if unseen, part of our society.

In recent years, the issue of how these networks could be targeted to bring communications and information exchanges to a standstill, and also of eavesdropping, has been central to international tensions between the US and China.

This geopolitical dimension of transcontinental cables inevitably gets intertwined with commercial interests, as deploying internet cables for thousands of kilometres is expensive, and Big Tech companies have increasingly entered the game with their own projects.

In Europe, ensuring the resilience of undersea critical infrastructure is a sensitive topic since the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline last September. European Commissioner Thierry Breton has since pushed a secure connectivity agenda combining a diversification of internet connections and satellite-based communications.

However, how the EU executive has selected and designed such projects has irked some European countries, which want to push their own agendas and companies.

Undersea cable pipeline

The Global Gateway, Europe’s strategy for financing international projects in competition with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, earmarked around €‎30 billion in digital connectivity projects such as submarine and terrestrial fibre-optic cables, space-based secure communication systems and data centres.

The lion’s share of EU funding to third countries is directed to Africa, where currently the main official project for EU-Africa connectivity is Medusa, which connects Southern Europe to Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia via the Mediterranean Sea.

According to a presentation the Commission gave to national representatives in April, another project is under consideration: EurAfrica Gateway, which would run from the Iberian Peninsula along the Atlantic coast of Western Africa through the Gulf of Guinea to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The intent is to connect underserved countries and build links with strategic partners in the region like Nigeria, the most populous African country where the Commission vowed to spend €‎820 million in digital projects.

Latin America and the Caribbean is another area of interest. The initial plan is to expand the BELLA programme, which includes EllaLink from Portugal to Brazil until Colombia and Peru, Caribbean islands like Cuba and the Dominic Republic and even up to Mexico via Central America.

Another proposal for which the EU would have available funding is the Far North Fiber, an internet cable to connect Scandinavia to Japan via the Arctic to avoid major choke points like the Suez Chanel and the South China Sea, revealed by EURACTIV last October.

The EU is already envisaging a potential project extension that would connect Japan to the Philippines, although there is no funding available for this part. Similarly, the EU considers this Artic cable fitting with the Humboldt Cable from Japan to Chile via Australia.

A further unbudgeted proposal is Southern Asia Connectivity, connecting Taiwan to Thailand via Indonesia, avoiding the South China Sea at the centre of military tension between Beijing and its neighbours.

The Southern Asia Connectivity would tie up with the South Africa and Indo-Pacific route starting from Thailand with a landing in India. Another EU project would link India up to the Medusa cable in the Mediterranean Sea, with a landing in Kenya.

Political dynamics

However, questions remain about how the European Commission plans these international projects and allocates the funding.

“Global Gateway projects are designed, developed and implemented in close cooperation and consultation with partner countries. Infrastructure projects will be based on the needs and opportunities that they identify for their local economies and local communities, as well as the EU’s own strategic interests,” a Commission spokesperson told EURACTIV.

Another EU official told EURACTIV on the condition of anonymity, “There is no justification for the investments. The decision-making is not fair nor transparent and happens behind closed doors.”

For instance, it is unclear why the EurAfrica Gateway would stop at the Democratic Republic of the Congo and not close the circle until South Africa, which would make commercial sense.

“Lobbying for sure plays a big part,” a second EU official acknowledged.

In March 2021, the EU Council adopted a ministerial declaration on European Data Gateways, which included a series of calls to action for “new, secure cable infrastructures can benefit from sources of growth in the European Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, the Arctic region, Africa, South and South East Asia.”

While the declaration provided the political impulse for the Commission to prioritise the topic, for some EU capitals, the Commission follows its own agenda rather than the path outlined in the declaration.

A third EU official pointed out that the Commission actively engages with the stakeholders to promote subsea cable projects. But while European companies like telecom operators and financial institutions are often interested, engagement from member states is limited.

Indeed, many EU countries that are not strategically placed or are landlocked have little interest in the geopolitics of internet cables. Those member states that are engaged are, more often than not, feathering their own nest.

France, for example, has strong economic ties with the former colonies in Western Africa and the oversea territories in the Indo-Pacific. Portugal is positioning itself as an international data hub that links Europe with Latin America and Western Africa.

Finland has vehemently advocated for the Arctic cable, which sees Finish company Cinia in the lead. So far, Helsinki has prevailed on the Stockholm-backed competing project called Polar Connect.

In other words, just like Europe’s increased attention to subsea infrastructure is a reaction to the embittering geopolitical context, deciding which geographical areas to prioritise is also an opaque mixture of commercial interests and political dynamics.

[Edited by Alice Taylor]

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